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Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Special 
Here, Special There, But Not Special 
Everywhere 
NATHAN PRICE†  
 INTRODUCTION 
Ana Herrera was only four months old when she was abandoned 
by both her mother and her father.1 Ana was left in the care of her 
maternal grandmother and did not have any further contact with her 
parents.2 Ana’s grandmother, try though she might, could not get a job 
and, as a result, Ana often did not have enough food.3 For almost two 
decades, Ana lived without guarantee of a daily meal, attempting to 
help when she could by working here and there, and unable to attend 
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 1.  Elizabeth Doerr, Young People Traveling Across the Border Alone Are Making it to 
Maryland – and Fighting to Stay, CITY PAPER (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.citypaper.com/news/features/bcp-062516-feature-ana-profile-20160525-
story.html. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
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school because of her poverty and the incessant local gang violence.4 
One day, Ana was in her neighborhood and witnessed the murder 
of her cousin.5 To make matters worse, the murderers knew she saw 
them.6 Fearing for her life, Ana left her home country of El Salvador 
alone and headed towards the United States, where her aunt lived.7 
Four dangerous weeks and 2,000 miles later, traveling on foot and by 
bus, Ana made it to the Texas border and crossed into the Land of the 
Free.8 Ana was apprehended by Immigration Services and was sent to 
a detention center.9 After weeks of incarceration, Ana was sent to her 
aunt’s house in Maryland.10 Being over the age of eighteen, Ana was 
on a deadline if she was to benefit from Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status (SIJS),11 which is meant to help foreign children who have been 
abused, neglected, or abandoned find a better life in the United States.12 
Ana’s aunt petitioned the local Circuit Court for guardianship of her 
niece, as well as for specialized findings of fact13 required for SIJS: that 
Ana had been abandoned, abused, or neglected by one or both of her 
parents.14 The Circuit Court made the desired findings of fact and Ana 
was ultimately granted SIJS and became a legal resident of the United 
States.15 
Ana was one of the lucky ones. While Maryland allowed Ana to 
become dependent on a juvenile court through guardianship at 
nineteen years of age, there are many juveniles that are not so 
fortunate.16 SIJS is made available by a federal statute17 that allows 
 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Doerr, supra note 1. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006) 
(requiring that the juvenile be declared dependent on a juvenile court and that reunification 
with one or both parents not be viable due to “abuse, neglect, [or] abandonment” in order to 
qualify for SIJS); see also Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 1-201(a) (defining “child” as “an 
unmarried individual under the age of 21 years”). 
 12.  Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., 
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/special-immigrant-juveniles-
sij-status (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).  
 13.  Doerr, supra note 1. 
 14.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
 15.  Doerr, supra note 1. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1232 (2008). 
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immigrant juveniles who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected 
by one or both parents to petition a state juvenile court for special 
factual findings that will put the juvenile on an accelerated path to 
citizenship.18 The juvenile must also be declared dependent on that 
state juvenile court by that court, and must demonstrate that it is not in 
his or her best interest to return to the country of origin.19  Some 
children “age out” of SIJS eligibility while their SIJS applications are 
pending,20 and still others are prohibited from becoming dependent on 
a juvenile court once they are over the age of seventeen, depending on 
the state law.21 This Comment discusses several states’22 different 
approaches to applying SIJS, analyzes various problems found in those 
approaches, as well as the lack of uniformity across the states, and 
proposes several solutions to bridge the differences amongst the states 
and transform SIJS into the universal safeguard it was meant to be by 
ensuring a uniform, humanitarian application of SIJS.23 
SIJS seekers begin in state court, where certain factual findings 
must be made in order for them to proceed along the path of obtaining 
SIJS.24 These factual findings must be made as part of a proceeding 
that results in the SIJS seeker being adjudicated to be dependent on the 
court.25 This presents a unique federalism issue, as noted by some 
courts when addressing SIJS petitions.26 The issue of immigration 
regulation, in which state courts are required to play a part under the 
SIJS framework, has been unequivocally left to the federal government 
for over a century.27 By requiring state courts to make findings of fact 
that the Department of Homeland Security depends on when making 
immigration determinations, the SIJS statute effectively delegates 
certain aspects of immigration determination to state courts.28 As a 
 
 18.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing in Family 
Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 201, 213-14 (2014). 
 19.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Pulitzer, supra note 18. 
 20.  See Perez-Olano v. Gonzales, 248 F.R.D. 248, 268-69 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also 8 
C.F.R. § 204.11 (setting the age restriction for application as “under twenty-one years of age”). 
 21.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (West 2016) (defining a minor under Florida law as “any 
unmarried person under the age of 18 years” for purposes of child-related adjudications). 
 22.  Maryland, Florida, and California. 
 23.  See Pulitzer, supra note 18. 
 24.  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
 27.  Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of 
foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belong[s] to the government of the United States”). 
 28.  8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
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relatively new process, this has created challenges in the state courts, 
some of which grapple with the propriety of their new-found 
responsibility.29 
The importance of uniformity in SIJS adjudications across the 
fifty states, as well as safeguards against the rise of obstacles to SIJS 
seekers created by state law, cannot be understated. The success of 
otherwise identical SIJS petitions varies wildly from state to state. 
Because of the undeniable injustices this lack of uniformity produces, 
something must be done to ensure that petitions are treated equally, 
regardless of which state they are brought in. Furthermore, the lack of 
adequate safeguards in place to prevent procedural and substantive 
obstacles from arising further obviates the fact that something must be 
done to ensure that those that fall within the ambit and intent of the 
SIJS statute are able to take advantage of its protections. 
Part I of this Comment walks through the history of SIJS, from its 
inception in 199030 to present day. Part II discusses how SIJS has been 
applied in Maryland, Florida, and California through the discussion of 
select cases. These states were chosen because they represent three 
distinct ways in which state courts have addressed the SIJS issue.31 Part 
III identifies problems state courts have faced dealing with SIJS 
petitions and proposes solutions to those issues. Part III also proposes 
ways to ensure uniformity across the nation regarding SIJS petition 
adjudications and discusses nationwide solutions that could 
revolutionize the way SIJS is applied and enable thousands more 
immigrant children to profit from its protections. Lastly, Part III 
presents a realistic, comprehensive solution that would solve or curtail 
the issues discussed throughout the Comment. 
PART I. THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS 1990 
TO 1997 
Prior to 1990, there was no meaningful distinction in United 
States immigration law between immigrant adults and immigrant 
children.32 This was despite steps taken across the world during the late 
twentieth century toward implementing a “best interest of the child” 
 
 29.  See infra Part II.B. 
 30.  Heryka Knoespel, Note, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: a “Juvenile” Here is Not 
a “Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 507 (2013); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1101. 
 31.  See infra Part II. 
 32.  See Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 204. 
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philosophy when making decisions regarding a child’s rights.33  The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in 1990, mandated that: 
“[i]n all actions concerning children; whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.”34 However, the United States is one of three 
signatory states to the CRC that has not ratified it.35 This means that, 
while the United States cannot pass laws that conflict with this maxim 
or any of the CRC’s provisions, the United States does not have to 
positively pass or enforce legislation that will bring about the CRC’s 
humanitarian goals.36  
Instead of ratifying the CRC, the United States took its own steps 
towards considering the best interests of the child in 1990 by signing 
into law the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).37 The INA created 
a new form of relief for immigrant children who fit certain criteria: 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS).38 Under the INA, a child 
seeking SIJS would have to obtain from a state court: (1) an order 
declaring the child dependent on the court, (2) a finding that the child 
was eligible for long-term foster care, and (3) a finding that it was not 
in the child’s best interest to return to the child’s home country.39 In 
1993, federal regulations were promulgated that defined eligibility for 
long-term foster care as a situation where reunification with the child’s 
parents was no longer possible.40 Specifically, the regulation defined a 
child eligible for long-term foster care as one that would “normally be 
expected to remain in foster care until reaching the age of majority, 
unless the child is adopted or placed in a guardianship situation.”41 The 
regulations were silent on what constituted dependency on a state 
 
 33.  Id. at 208-09 (discussing the passage by the United Nations of the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child in 1959 and the subsequent Convention on the Rights of the Child passed 
in 1989); Convention of the Rights of the Child, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. 
Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter CRC].  
 34.  CRC, supra note 33; see also Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 209. 
 35.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 209 n.54 (stating that the three countries that had not 
ratified the CRC were: Somalia, South Sudan, and the United States). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 211; see also Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) 
(2006). 
 38.  8 U.S.C. § 1101; Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211. 
 39.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Theo Liebmann, Family Court and the Unique Needs 
of Children and Families Who Lack Immigration Status, 40 SOLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 583, 
589 (2007). 
 40.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211 n.73; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2006). 
 41.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211 n.73 
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court, as well as any indication as to the proper best interest factors, 
making such determinations purely a matter of state law.42  
Armed with the three factual determinations of the state court, the 
SIJS applicant would then send the court documents and proper legal 
forms to the local Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
District Office.43 The final step in the application was an interview with 
INS, which reviewed and rendered a decision on the immigration 
aspect of the application.44 
A. 1997 to 2008 
In 1997, Congress amended the requirements of SIJS, primarily 
out of concern for fraud by juveniles using student visas.45 Congress 
became concerned that these juveniles sought to become dependents 
on a state court in order to gain legal status rather than to actually 
escape abuse, abandonment, or neglect.46 For example, in 2003, the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remarked that a large loophole 
existed for any visiting student where the student could file a petition 
with the appropriate state court requesting SIJS on the basis that he or 
she qualified for foster care, with a substantial chance that the petition 
would succeed based on the students’ separation from any potential 
caregiver.47  
The statute was amended to require not only that the child be 
eligible for long-term foster care, but that the child be eligible for long-
term foster care because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.48 The 
statute, as amended, also required any child already in custody of the 
immigration authorities to seek the consent of the United States 
Attorney General before beginning any kind of state court dependency 
proceeding.49 This change was controversial because, prior to the 
 
 42.  8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (requiring that dependency determinations be made “in 
accordance with state law governing such declarations of dependence”); Pulitzer, supra note 
18, at 211 n.73. 
 43.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211 n.74. 
 44.  Id. at 211-12. For purposes of this Comment, this will be the final mention of the 
latter portion of the application process because the procedure has remained substantially the 
same since the inception of SIJS. In addition, the process is applied relatively uniformly across 
the country and is not subject to the same problems discussed herein. 
 45.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 212. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Knoespel, 
supra note 30, at 507. 
 48.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 212. 
 49.  Id. 
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amendment, state courts had full jurisdiction over all immigrant 
juveniles, regardless of the their detainment status.50 The change 
limited the number of juveniles able to seek SIJS, prohibiting the many 
juveniles who were already in the custody of the Department of 
Homeland Security or Immigration and Customs Enforcement from 
beginning the SIJS process.51 
B. 2008 to Present 
In 2008, Congress took dramatic steps toward rearming the SIJS 
statute with the power it needed to protect the vulnerable, underage 
immigrants for whom it was created. Congress passed the William 
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
(TVPRA),52 which clarified the requirements a child needed to meet to 
be eligible for SIJS, and greatly expanded the number of immigrant 
children that were eligible.53 The TVPRA amended the SIJS eligibility 
requirements so that, in order to qualify, a child needed to: (1) be 
declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or 
be declared dependent on an individual or entity appointed by a State 
or juvenile court, (2) obtain a finding from a juvenile court that the 
minor is unable to reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment by the parent(s), and (3) obtain a finding from 
a juvenile court that it would not be in the child’s best interest to return 
to the child’s country of nationality or previous habitual residence.54 
This was a substantial step towards achieving the goals set forth by the 
CRC: that all adjudications regarding immigrant children have the 
child’s best interest as the primary objective.55 With this amendment, 
the child no longer needed to be eligible for long-term foster care and 
now required a finding that at least one parent had abused, abandoned, 
or neglected the child.56 The amendment also explicitly required that 
the state court consider the best interest of the child when determining 
the child’s eligibility for SIJS.57 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 8 
U.S.C. § 1232 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA]. 
 53.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 213; see also Knoespel, supra note 30, at 509. 
 54.  TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006); see also Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 213; see also Knoespel, supra 
note 30, at 510. 
 55.  CRC, supra note 33; Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 209. 
 56.  See TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008); 8 U.S.C. §1101; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. 
 57.  See TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008); 8 U.S.C. §1101; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. 
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The TVPRA also instituted limited “age-out” protections at the 
federal level for children eligible for SIJS by requiring United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to consider the age of 
the child at the time the child filed his or her petition for SIJS.58 This 
prevented a common occurrence where otherwise eligible children 
would pass the cut-off age of twenty-one while their applications were 
passed from desk to desk or were lost, sometimes multiple times.59 The 
amendment also required that the USCIS process a petition within 180 
days of its receipt, dramatically decreasing the amount of time it would 
take these petitions to receive a final adjudication.60 
PART II. APPLICATION OF SIJS 
This section describes and analyzes current SIJS case law in three 
states: Maryland, Florida, and California. These states were chosen 
because each one demonstrates some of the larger trends that have 
emerged across the nation within state courts faced with SIJS petitions. 
Maryland courts have at times failed to reach the SIJS issues because 
of procedural and substantive obstacles that have arisen through 
Maryland’s application of its Family Law Article and Maryland 
common law precedent.61 Florida courts have taken issue with the role 
they are now asked to play in immigration, a field they contend is a 
purely federal concern.62 The California courts, in contrast, have 
consistently addressed the SIJS issue, making SIJS findings of fact in 
cases of juvenile delinquency and thereby demonstrating their 
commitment to making said findings when presented.63 The analysis 
focuses on the factors and definitions used by each state in the 
adjudication of SIJS petitions. Multiple cases will be discussed and 
analyzed to obtain a picture of the legal landscape surrounding SIJS 
across the three chosen States. 
A. Maryland 
The Maryland court system has four levels.64 There are two trial 
 
 58.  Knoespel, supra note 30, at 510; see also TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008). 
 59.  Knoespel, supra note30, at 510; Emily Rose Gonzalez, Battered Immigrant Youth 
Take the Beat: Special Immigrant Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 409, 410 (2009). 
 60.  Knoespel, supra note 30, at 510. 
 61.  See infra Part II.A. 
 62.  See infra Part II.B. 
 63.  See infra Part II.C. 
 64.  About the Maryland Court System, MD. CTS., 
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court levels: the District Court, with limited jurisdiction over small 
claims valued at or below fifteen thousand dollars, and the Circuit 
Court, with general jurisdiction.65 The Court of Special Appeals serves 
as the intermediate appellate tribunal, and the Court of Appeals serves 
as the state’s highest appellate court.66 
The Maryland state courts, as discussed below, demonstrate a 
willingness to make the findings of fact when presented; however, they 
have encountered obstacles arising out of Maryland state family law. 
These obstacles have prevented the Circuit Courts from reaching the 
merits of the case, instead disposing of the petitions through various 
procedural or substantive technicalities.67 
i. In re Dany G.  
The Court of Special Appeals in In re Dany G.68 clarified what 
factors must be considered by Maryland courts when determining (1) 
whether a child had been neglected by his or her parents and (2) 
whether it was in that child’s best interest to return to his or her country 
of origin.69 The Court also discussed how the Maryland appellate 
courts viewed the role Maryland courts were to play within the unique 
federalism framework created by the SIJS statute.70 Because the 
guardianship in this case had already been granted, and thus a finding 
of dependency already effectuated, the Court was not confronted with 
the various substantive and procedural issues that have prevented 
Circuit Courts from reaching the SIJS factors.71 
In re Dany G. arose out of the Circuit Court’s denial of the motion 
for SIJS findings made by the petitioning guardian.72 Specifically, the 
 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/courts/about.html (last visited May 13, 2017). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See In re Guardianship of Zealand W. and Sophia W., 220 Md. App. 66, 82 (2014) 
(holding that, because the biological mother’s parental rights had not been terminated, the 
court could not grant guardianship of the juvenile to a third party, thereby preventing a finding 
of dependency); see Jose B. v. Maria B., No. 2179, 2016 WL 4261814, at *4 (Md. App. Aug. 
8, 2016) (requiring a prospective guardian to overcome the presumption of custody in favor 
of the biological parent despite that parent’s consent to the guardianship). But see Simbaina v. 
Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 452 (2015) (citing Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 
109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)) (internal quotations omitted) (discussing the respective roles of 
the state courts and the federal government in the SIJS process). 
 68.  In re Dany G., 223 Md. App. 707 (2015). 
 69.  Id. at 720-22. 
 70.  Id. at 712-18. 
 71.  See infra Part II.A.ii-iv. 
 72.  In re Dany G., 223 Md. App. at 710. 
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Circuit Court held that the minor, over whom the petitioner had already 
been granted guardianship by the same court, had not been abused, 
abandoned, or neglected by his mother or father.73 The Circuit Court 
did not reach the issue of whether or not it was in the juvenile’s best 
interest to return to his native country of Guatemala.74 The Court of 
Special Appeals vacated and remanded the case back to the Circuit 
Court.75 It held that the Circuit Court had applied the wrong legal 
standard in considering whether the minor had been neglected by his 
parents76 and that the Circuit Court’s failure to determine whether it 
was in the minor’s best interest to return to Guatemala was, at least in 
part, based on an improper application of Maryland law.77  
In making its decision, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted 
the SIJS statute to require the application of state law, regardless of 
where the abuse, abandonment, or neglect occurred.78 This deviated 
from the intermediate appellate courts of New Jersey,79 which have 
required that their trial courts apply the “New Jersey state law 
definitions but as applied in the context of the child’s home country.”80 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals made its decision on the 
grounds that the “federal law directs the states to apply state law, not a 
hybrid of the law of a single American state superimposed on the living 
conditions of another country.”81 According to the court, this was 
because the state judges have expertise in applying their state’s family 
law concepts82 and this approach was “more consistent with the 
humanitarian purpose of the federal law.”83 
 
 73.  Id. at 710-12. 
 74.  Id. at 712. 
 75.  Id. at 722. 
 76.  Id. (stating that the Circuit Court had failed to consider whether the child’s welfare 
had been harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm). 
 77.  Id. at 720-722. 
 78. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 717 (“We hold that the trial court must apply state law 
definitions of ‘abuse,’ ‘neglect,’ ‘abandonment,’ ‘similar basis under state law,’ and ‘best 
interest of the child’ as we would in Maryland, without taking into account where the child 
lived at the time the abuse, neglect, or abandonment occurred.”). 
 79.  H.S.P. v. J.K., 435 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 2014); D.C. v. A.B.C., 417 N.J. Super. 
41 (Ch. Div. 2010). 
 80.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App.  at 717 (discussing cases cited supra, note 79). 
 81.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App.  at 717-18 (discussing Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 [amended by TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 
1232 (2008)]). 
 82.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 718 (quoting In re Y.M., 207 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 
(2012)). 
 83.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 718 (citing In re Y.M., 207 Cal. App. 4th at 909). 
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The Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied the standard of 
“neglect” as it is defined by the Maryland Family Law Article84 and 
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.85 Under both articles, 
“neglect” is defined in Maryland as “the leaving of a child unattended 
or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any 
parent … under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or 
welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm.”86 The Court 
found that the Circuit Court had only applied the first half of the correct 
standard; namely, the Circuit Court had found that the minor was not 
neglected because his parents had not physically left him to fend for 
himself.87 The Court went on to say that several different facts in the 
case would meet the standard of neglect in Maryland.88 Moving on to 
the best interest determination, the  Court of Special Appeals defined 
a child’s best interest as the evaluation of “the child’s life chances … 
and [a] predict[ion] with whom the child will be better off in the 
future.”89 
This case sheds light on the role the Maryland appellate courts 
believe the circuit courts should play in the SIJS process. This case 
proposes that the circuit courts are not “granting SIJ status [but] 
[r]ather [are] making factual findings that the child meets certain 
eligibility requirements.”90 Furthermore, the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals stated, “[i]f the underlying juvenile court filing is 
properly before the court, state courts are required to make [the SIJS] 
factual findings.”91  In this case, the guardianship had already been 
granted and the motion for the SIJS factual findings was filed after the 
minor had already been deemed a dependent on the court by 
establishing guardianship, meaning the court had already adjudicated 
 
 84.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(s) (West). 
 85.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(s) (West); In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. 
at 720. 
 86.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 720 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proceedings 
§ 3-801; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701) (alterations in original). 
 87.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 720-21. 
 88.  Id. at 721 (“We are also mindful that is parents in Maryland allow or force their child 
to leave school at the age of 12, this factor would lead to a finding that the child was 
neglected.”). 
 89.  Id. (quoting Montgomery Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419 
(1977)). In a footnote, the Court of Special Appeals stated that it was not itself deciding what 
the term “similar basis” included as used in the SIJS statute, but acknowledged that the words 
“similar basis” were “added by the TVPRA to allow for the expansion of the protected grounds 
beyond those of abuse, neglect, and abandonment.” In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 722 n.6 
(quoting Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 225). 
 90.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 714. 
 91.  Id. at 715 (citing Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 455-56 (2015)). 
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the juvenile matter and had a duty to rule on the SIJS determinations.92 
ii. Jose B. v. Maria B. 
Jose B. v. Maria B.93 demonstrates one of the obstacles Maryland 
courts have encountered arising out of Maryland family law. The Court 
of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court had correctly refused to 
make the SIJS findings because the underlying petition, that of 
guardianship, was denied.94 
In an unreported opinion, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of a petition for custody and the 
accompanying petition for judicial finding of SIJS facts in regard to 
petitioner’s niece, Heidy.95 The crux of the petition was that the 
petitioner, as Heidy’s uncle, wanted custody of Heidy because Heidy’s 
mother was the subject of deportation proceedings and could be 
deported “at any time,” and neither party wanted Heidy to also be 
deported.96 The Court of Special Appeals held that “[i]f the court finds 
no unfitness on the part of the biological parent or extraordinary 
circumstances that make it detrimental for the child to remain in the 
parent’s care, the presumption [in favor of custody of the biological 
parent] remains, and custody must be awarded to the biological 
parent.”97 The Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of the petition 
because there was no error or abuse of discretion in finding no 
unfitness (nor was any alleged) of Heidy’s mother nor exceptional 
circumstances in the “entirely speculative and unlikely”98 deportation 
proceedings related to Heidy.99 The Court also held that, “in the 
absence of the grant of custody to [petitioner], the court was not 
required to make the required findings in relation to Heidy’s eligibility 
for SIJ status.”100 
This case demonstrates some of the procedural and substantive 
 
 92.  In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 711 (“Charlene M. (‘Charlene’) was appointed 
guardian of her cousin, Dany G. (‘Dany’), a native of Guatemala, on November 20, 2013, by 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.”). 
 93.  Jose B. v. Maria B., No. 2179, 2016 WL 4261814, at *4 (Md. App. Aug. 8, 2016) 
 94.  Id. at *4. 
 95.  Id. at *1. 
 96.  Id. at *2 (“[Jose]’s attorney explained that [Maria] [was] attempting to make 
arrangements for her unmarried daughter should [Maria] be deported. Even though [Maria] 
has a family, she could be deported at any time”). 
 97.  Id. at *4 (discussing McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 325 (2005)). 
 98.  Jose B., 2016 WL 4261814, at *2. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at *4. 
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obstacles SIJS seekers face that are unique to Maryland law. Heidy 
was not given the requisite finding of facts, despite the consent of her 
mother to the change in custody, solely because of the presumption in 
favor of custody of the biological parent that exists in Maryland.101 
Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals supported the Circuit 
Court’s statement that “the parties cannot sidestep the requirements of 
the law simply by indicating consent has been reached”102 and that “[a] 
biological parent cannot be permitted to consent to a change in custody 
to a third party solely in an attempt to obtain a ‘green card’ for his or 
her child, when no other legal factual factors support the change.”103  
iii. In re Guardianship of Zealand W. 
In re Guardianship of Zealand W.104 set several important 
precedents in Maryland appellate advocacy, as well as family law.105  
The Court of Special Appeals held that a circuit court could not appoint 
a third-party guardian of a minor where at least one of the minor’s 
parents was still alive whose parental rights had not been terminated.106 
In this case, Zealand’s father was deceased,107 which made 
Zealand’s mother the sole natural guardian.108 Because Zealand’s 
mother’s parental rights had never been terminated, the Court held that 
the Circuit Court had no authority to grant a third party guardianship 
over Zealand, either temporary or permanent.109 The Court of Special 
Appeals relied heavily on the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision in 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K.,110 where the Court of 
Appeals held that “[u]ntil [a determination on the termination of 
parental rights has been made], ‘[t]he parents [are] the natural 
guardians of their minor child’ and are ‘responsible for the child’s 
 
 101.  Id. at *3 (“In deciding a custody case between a third party and the biological parent 
of a child, the presumption is in favor of custody in the biological parent.”) (citing Karen P. 
v. Christopher J.B., 163 Md. App. 250, 265 (2005)). 
 102.  Jose B., 2016 WL 4261814, at *4 (internal quotations omitted). 
 103.  Id. at *4. 
 104.  In re Guardianship of Zealand W. and Sophia W., 220 Md. App. 66, 82 (2014) 
 105.  In re Jason Daniel M.-A., No. 0128, 2016 WL 769860, at *3-*6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
Feb. 29, 2016) (discussing the ramifications of the In re Zealand decision). 
 106.  In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 85-86. 
 107.  Id. at 71. 
 108.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(a) (West); In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 
220 Md. App. at 80. 
 109.  In re Guardianship of Zealand  W., 220 Md. App. at 82. 
 110.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K., 434 Md. 198 (2013); see In re Zealand W., 
220 Md. App. at 82 (discussing In re Tracy K. and the similarities between the cases). 
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support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.’”111 The Court of 
Appeals arrived at that conclusion because of the inquiries Title 5 of 
the Family Law Article requires courts to make into the best interests 
of the child before ruling on the termination of parental rights.112 The 
Court of Special Appeals concluded that: 
[w]hat was said in Tracy K. is here applicable. Section 
13-702(a) of the Estates & Trusts Article does not allow 
a circuit court judge to appoint a guardian of the person 
of a minor child where, as here: (1) the mother of the 
child is still living; and (2) the mother’s rights have 
never been terminated in this state pursuant to Title 5 of 
the Family Law Article; and (3) parental rights have not 
been terminated by any other court.113 
The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case back to the 
Circuit Court with directions to reconsider the mother’s motion to 
dismiss the case.114 
In re Guardianship of Zealand W. had the practical effect of 
adding a procedural obstacle in the path of a juvenile seeking SIJS 
findings in Maryland: that the seeker’s parent(s)’s parental rights must 
be terminated prior to any guardianship being granted.115 This is 
another example of procedural and substantive barriers unique to 
Maryland’s state law that contribute to the lack of uniformity in how 
SIJS petitions are dealt with across the nation. 
iv. Simbaina v. Bunay 
In Simbaina v. Bunay,116 the Court of Special Appeals considered 
the refusal of the Circuit Court to make the SIJS factual findings during 
an absolute divorce hearing that addressed the custody of Nathaly, the 
minor.117 The Court determined that the Circuit Court “should have 
heard testimony and evidence relating to Nathaly’s SIJ status” and 
“[u]pon remand … should evaluate Nathaly’s request under SIJ 
 
 111.  In re Tracy K., 434 Md. at 208 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(a, b)). 
 112.  In re Tracy K., 434 Md. at 208. 
 113.  In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 82. 
 114.  Id. at 88-89. The Court of Special Appeals confirmed its stance on the matter in a 
previous case, holding that, absent the termination of parental rights of living parents, a 
guardianship could not be granted. Id. 
 115.  Id. at 85-86. 
 116.  Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440 (2015). 
 117.  Id. at 445-46. 
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standards.”118 The Court also discussed the SIJS framework in detail, 
providing insight into the Maryland appellate court’s interpretation of 
the procedural constructs of SIJS.119 
The Appellant, Maria Simbaina (hereinafter, Simbaina), 
responded to her then husband’s Complaint for Custody by filing a 
Counter-Complaint for Divorce and Custody.120 During the litigation, 
Simbaina requested that the court “enter an Order finding that it is not 
in Nathaly’s best interest to return to her home country and 
reunification with [Bunay] is not viable due to abuse[,] neglect[,] or 
abandonment.”121 The Circuit Court refused to make the requisite SIJS 
findings, suggesting that Simbaina needed a “petition for some type of 
guardianship” that must “be filed with the court concerning any 
immigration issues,” and that no immigration issues would be 
discussed because “they were not properly pled.”122 The resulting order 
granted the absolute divorce between the parties and addressed 
Nathaly’s custody, but did not include any factual findings on 
Nathaly’s SIJS eligibility.123 The Circuit Court denied Simbaina’s 
Motion to Alter or Amend and her Motion for a New Trial.124 On 
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether “the circuit 
court err[ed] when it failed to make Special Immigrant Juvenile factual 
findings during the divorce and custody proceedings.”125 The Court 
answered in the affirmative and remanded the case to the Circuit Court 
to make the requisite factual findings.126 
The Court of Special Appeals discussed several key aspects of 
SIJS determination, namely: (1) separation of state and federal powers 
and concerns regarding state regulation of immigration,127 (2) circuit 
court jurisdiction over SIJS,128 and (3) pleading requirements for SIJS 
determinations.129 Addressing the separation of powers, the court drew 
a distinction between the federal government’s interests in the 
immigration status of the juveniles and the circuit court’s power, which 
 
 118.  Id. at 458. 
 119.  Id. at 450-59. 
 120.  Id. at 446. 
 121.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 122.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 447 (internal quotations omitted). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 448. 
 126.  Id. at 459. 
 127.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 450-52. 
 128.  Id. at 453-57. 
 129.  Id. 457-58. 
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included making “determinations helpful to determining the 
immigration status of certain individuals.”130 The Court of Special 
Appeals recognized that “[t]he federal government delegated [the 
power to make these determinations] to State juvenile courts because 
these courts are the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations 
regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best 
interests.”131 The Court of Special Appeals remarked that “it is 
important to note that the State court is not rendering an immigration 
determination, because the ultimate decisions regarding the child’s 
immigration status rests with the federal government,”132 but that state 
courts are ultimately responsible for making the underlying findings.133 
The Court held that the jurisdiction to make the SIJS findings 
“extends to any court that has jurisdiction under state law to make 
judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles” and 
confirmed the circuit courts’ ability to make SIJS findings outside of a 
separate guardianship hearing.134 Because the circuit court was 
empowered to make determinations regarding the custody of the minor 
during the divorce hearing, it was also empowered to make the 
requisite SIJS findings as a court having “jurisdiction under state law 
to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of 
juveniles,” and should therefore have considered evidence regarding 
Nathaly’s SIJS eligibility.135 The Court of Special Appeals noted that 
there were no restrictions in the federal statute limiting the appropriate 
proceedings or procedures through which the SIJS factual findings 
were to be made.136 Rather, the sole limitation was that the findings be 
made by a “juvenile court,” as defined in the federal regulations.137  
The Court of Special Appeals quickly dispatched the pleading 
requirement issue by citing Maryland Rule 2-303(b), which requires 
only that “pleadings be simple, concise, and direct.”138 The court held 
that Simbaina’s amended complaint made clear that “she sought [the 
SIJS] additional findings from the court.”139 The court went on to note 
 
 130.  Id. at 452. 
 131.  Id. at 451 (internal quotations omitted). 
 132.  Id. at 452 (citing Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 133.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App at 452. 
 134.  Id. at 454 (internal quotations omitted). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 455. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 457 (citing Md. Rule 2-303(b)). 
 139.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 457. 
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that, “[w]hile a separate motion can be filed […] it is not required by 
the federal statute,” but that, “[w]hen pleading [the SIJS] issue before 
the circuit court, a moving party should ensure that the court is on 
notice of the request for these factual findings.”140  In the instant case, 
the Court of Special Appeals held that the pleading was sufficient.141 
B. Florida 
Similar to the Maryland court system, the Florida court system 
consists of four levels: two trial court levels and two appellate court 
levels.142 At the trial level, County Courts hear cases involving fifteen 
thousand dollars or less and the Circuit Courts hear all other matters.143 
The District Courts of Appeal serve as the state’s intermediate 
appellate court, with the Florida Supreme Court sitting as the state’s 
highest appellate court.144 
The Florida appellate courts have expressed concerns with both 
their role in the immigration process and  the possibility for abuse of 
the SIJS process.145 These concerns have manifested themselves in the 
definitions and requirements the appellate courts have used and 
implemented when considering SIJS petitions. 
i. In re S.A.R.D. 
In re S.A.R.D.146 demonstrates the Florida appellate court’s 
apprehension and concern regarding the state courts’ roles in the SIJS 
process. In its opinion, the District Court of Appeals discusses the SIJS 
process in detail and describes its issue with inputting best interest 
concerns into immigration determinations.147 The Court, discussing the 
SIJS factors, found that any abandonment, neglect, or abuse cannot to 
be too far removed from the time the petition is filed if the petition is 
to succeed, a requirement that is not based on, or found in, the federal 
statute.148 
In re S.A.R.D. came before the District Court of Appeal of Florida 
 
 140.  Id. at 458 (internal citations omitted). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Florida State’s Court System, FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/system2.shtml (last visited May 13, 2017). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See infra Part II.B.i-iii. 
 146.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 147.  Id. at 897-901. 
 148.  See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006). 
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on appeal because of the Circuit Court’s denial of S.A.R.D.’s petition, 
nine days before his eighteenth birthday, for the required SIJS finding 
of dependency under the relevant Florida statute.149 In his petition, 
S.A.R.D. alleged that he was abandoned by his father at the age of 
seven, over ten years before the filing of his petition, and that he was 
neglected by his mother leading up to his departure from his native 
country of Honduras in 2014, approximately two years before his 
petition.150 The District Court of Appeal began its analysis by 
reviewing the history of the SIJS provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and its intended purpose.151 The court discussed 
the “bifurcated procedure” for obtaining SIJS, stating that: 
Although it is clear that under our federal system the 
policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their rights 
to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress, 
we are being asked to provide an initial stamp of 
approval to a child’s request for SIJ status and 
permanent residency as if we are federal customs 
agents.152 
The Court took issue with the fact that, “because the matter is 
before the dependency court, the dependency court must base its 
decision, in part, on what is in the best interest of the child, as opposed 
to what is in the best interest of the country.”153 The Court discussed 
the possible repercussions of using its role to expand SIJS to cover 
“children who leave their families and homes in other countries […] 
and illegally enter the United States without their parent(s) in search 
of a better life.”154 In further support of its contentions, the Court 
described the great difficulty of investigating the claims of abuse, 
abandonment, and neglect regarding parents living in other 
countries.155 
The Court first discussed the alleged abandonment by S.A.R.D.’s 
father.156 Once again bemoaning the unverifiable nature of the 
allegations and the lack of an adversarial proceeding,157 the Court 
 
 149.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 899. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 899-901. 
 152.  Id. at 900 (citing In re K.B.K.V., 176 So. 3d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)). 
 153.  Id. at 900-01. 
 154.  Id. at 901. 
 155.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 901. 
 156.  Id. at 902. 
 157.  Id. (“As already noted above, however, S.A.R.D.’s petition was not subjected to an 
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discussed five factors158 proposed by the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal for consideration in private dependency petitions.159 The 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the 
father’s abandonment over ten years prior to the filing of the petition 
was too far removed to merit a dependency finding.160 The District 
Court of Appeal stated that it was clear that “S.A.R.D., for the 
[remaining] nine-day period of his minority status, was not in 
substantial risk of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”161 In discussing the 
alleged neglect by S.A.R.D.’s mother, the court noted that, under 
Florida statutory law, a guardian of a child cannot be found to have 
neglected the child if the neglect was caused “primarily by financial 
inability [to care for the child] unless actual services for relief have 
been offered to and rejected by such person.”162 The Court found there 
was no evidence that S.A.R.D.’s mother was financially able to meet 
S.A.R.D.’s needs and that “the family’s poverty, without more, does 
not constitute neglect as contemplated by our dependency statutes.”163 
In this case, the Court read into the SIJS statute a proximity 
requirement to the determination of whether or not a juvenile had been 
abused, neglected, or abandoned.164 
ii. In re F.J.G.M. 
In re F.J.G.M.165 confirmed the Florida appellate courts’ position 
regarding the temporal proximity of the abandonment, abuse, or 
neglect and an SIJS petition. The Court held that the abandonment 
alleged by the petitioner was too far removed in time to provide a basis 
for an SIJS finding.166 This holding instituted a new obstacle to 
achieving SIJS: that the abandonment, neglect, or abuse be either 
sufficiently close in time to the relevant petition or that it be imminent. 
 
adversarial proceeding.”). 
 158.  (1) The nature, severity and frequency of the abuse, neglect, or abandonment; (2) the 
time that has elapsed between the abuse, neglect or abandonment and the filing of the petition; 
(3) whether the child is presently at a continued, but not necessarily imminent, risk of harm 
before turning eighteen years old; (4) the availability of a caregiver capable of providing both 
supervision and care; and (5) any other relevant factors unique to the particular case. Id. 
 159.  Id. at 902 (citing O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children and Families,169 So. 3d 1244, 1249 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)). 
 160.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 903. 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. at 903-04 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30) (defining “harm” as it relates to neglect 
of the child) and FLA. STAT. § 39.01(44) (defining “neglect”)). 
 163.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 905. 
 164.  Id. at 903. 
 165. In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).  
 166.  Id. at 539 
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This opinion also brought to light several of the primary issues that the 
Florida bench saw in its role in the SIJS process, including its own 
policy considerations and views on immigration.167 
In re F.J.G.M. arose out of F.J.G.M.’s mother’s petition for 
F.J.G.M. to be declared dependent on the Florida Court in order to 
become eligible for SIJS.168 The petition alleged that F.J.G.M. had been 
abandoned at birth by his father,169 which qualified him as a dependent 
under Florida law.170  
The Third District Court of Appeals characterized the mother’s 
petition as “an attempt to expand the stated purpose of the [SIJS 
statute],”171 as well as encouraging illegal immigration and placing a 
“very difficult burden upon the state courts tasked with reviewing these 
private dependency petitions and making dependency 
determinations.”172 The District Court of Appeals discussed the alleged 
abandonment by F.J.G.M.’s father at birth as it related to the Florida 
Statutes173 and found: (1) the abandonment, over thirteen years before 
the dependency proceeding, was too far removed to support a finding 
of dependency and (2) F.J.G.M. was “not at a substantial risk of 
imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect when his mother filed the 
petition [since he was] living with and being cared for by his mother 
in Miami.”174 Based on those findings, the District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s denial of the petition on the basis that the 
abandonment by the minor’s father was too far removed to be 
considered in an SIJS adjudication.175 
The Court focused on the alleged purpose of the SIJS in avoiding 
the deportation of the minor with or to the abusive, neglectful, or 
abandoning parent(s).176 This approach ignored the discussion of the 
best interests of the child, instead focusing on procedure and a narrow, 
 
 167.  Id. at 538. 
 168. Id. at 536. 
 169.  While no father was listed on the birth certificate or during several other proceedings, 
including the mother’s application for public assistance, Alexis Escobar, the suspected father, 
acknowledged paternity during the dependency proceedings. Id. at 536-37. 
 170.  Id. at 538-39 (defining dependent child under FLA. STAT § 39.01(15) as “one who has 
been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents or legal guardians”).  
 171.  In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d at 538. 
 172.  Id. at 538 (citing In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)). 
 173.  In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d at 538-539. 
 174.  Id. at 539. 
 175.  Id. at 540. 
 176.  Id. at 538. 
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relatively unsupported reading of the SIJS statute’s intent. This opinion 
also alluded to the fact that Florida courts are faced with a large number 
of petitions for dependency aimed at qualifying the minor beneficiary 
for SIJS.177 There was concern from the Court that extending 
dependency findings to juveniles who were not in danger of being 
neglected, abused, or abandoned would “encourage illegal 
immigration.”178  
iii. O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families 
Florida courts, as discussed above, have demonstrated a dislike 
for the burden placed on them by the SIJS procedure. This dislike has 
manifested in decisions based on narrow or novel readings of the 
requirements of SIJS.179 The Florida courts have justified their 
positions by citing policy concerns regarding the nation’s immigration 
policies and have attempted to curtail the number of successful SIJS 
petitions, acting more as a gatekeeper than as a fact finder determining 
what is in the juvenile’s best interest.180 O.I.C.L. v. Department of 
Children and Families181 was another case requiring a close proximity 
in time between the alleged abuse, abandonment, or neglect and the 
petition for SIJS findings. The Court in O.I.C.L. held that, in order for 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect to provide the basis for SIJS finding 
of facts, it must have occurred close in time to the petition or be 
imminent.182 
O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families was before the 
District Court of Appeal on appeal by O.I.C.L. because of the denial 
of his petition for dependency, in which he argued he had been 
abandoned by his parents and had no parent or legal custodians capable 
of providing supervision and care.183 In his petition, O.I.C.L. alleged 
that he had been abandoned by his father and neglected by his mother 
since the age of twelve, over six years prior to the filing of the petition 
 
 177.  Id. at 538 (“[these many petitions place] a very difficult burden upon the state courts 
tasked with reviewing these private dependency petitions.”). 
 178.  In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d at 538. 
 179.  Id. at 540 (holding that the abandonment of petitioner by his father 13 years prior to 
the petition was too far removed to be considered). 
 180.  Id. at 538 (“The purpose of the [SIJS] Act is not to provide exemption from 
deportation to children who forgo legal immigration migration to the United States and 
illegally enter the United States in search of a better life or to be reunited with a family member 
who came to the United States legally or illegally.”). 
 181.  O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 182.  Id. at 1248. 
 183.  Id. at 1246. 
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at issue.184 The allegations of neglect centered on O.I.C.L.’s mother’s 
inability to provide sufficient food, water, and clothing for O.I.C.L.185 
The trial court denied the petition, finding that O.I.C.L. was living with 
an uncle who fit the definition of “caregiver” under the Florida 
Statutes186 and who had, therefore, become a “relative caregiver” 
legally responsible for O.I.C.L.’s welfare.187 In affirming the trial 
court’s ruling, the appellate court considered: (1) “whether a 
dependency adjudication can be based on alleged abuse or neglect 
occurring at any time, even if remote to the petition’s filing,”188 and (2) 
whether a child living in conditions of poverty was on its own 
sufficient to sustain a finding of abandonment or neglect.189  
The District Court of Appeals held that not considering the length 
of time between the adjudication and the alleged abuse or neglect 
would lead to the absurd result of permitting “the adjudication of a 
seventeen-year-old based upon an isolated incident of ‘abuse’ inflicted 
at the age of two by a long since deceased parent.”190 The court held 
that finding a child dependent under those circumstances would permit 
the irrational result of allowing “the adjudication of any child ever 
subjected to abuse, abandonment, or neglect by a parent at any point 
during their minority.”191 
The District Court of Appeals also engaged in an analysis of the 
statutory definitions of “abandoning a child,”192 “neglect,”193 and 
“neglecting a child,”194 and found that, absent a willful refusal of 
available resources, the inability to provide for a child as a result of 
poverty did not constitute neglect or abandonment.195 The Court 
observed that:  
Judicial resources too often are being misused to obtain 
dependency orders for minors who are neither abused, 
neglected or abandoned, and who seek a dependency 
 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10).; FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(47). 
 187.  O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1247. 
 188.  Id. at 1248. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. (citing Holly v, Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). 
 191.  O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1248. 
 192.  FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(1).  
 193.  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(44). 
 194.  FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(30).  
 195.  O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1249. 
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adjudication and best-interest order not because they 
are endangered and need protection but because they 
want preferential immigration treatment without having 
to comply with the requirements of the customary legal 
immigration process.196 
The Court noted, however, that the motivations behind a child’s 
petition for dependency should not factor into the court’s decision, 
although the motivations seem to have indeed been a factor the Court 
considered in determining the relevance of the difference in time 
between the alleged abuse or neglect and the petition in this case.197 
C. California 
California has organized its court in three levels: two appellate 
levels and one trial level.198 There is one trial court, a Superior Court, 
in each county.199 The District Courts of Appeal serve as the 
intermediate appellate courts, with the Supreme Court sitting as the 
state’s highest court.200 
The California Courts have embraced their roles as initial fact 
finders and have set, as their purpose, determining what is in the best 
interest of the child, provided that certain baseline criteria are met. 
California courts have consistently made SIJS findings when 
requested, making the granting of SIJS petitions the rule rather than 
the exception.201 
i. Leslie H. v. Superior Court 
Leslie H. v. Superior Court202 arose out of the Superior Court’s 
refusal to make SIJS findings during a delinquency adjudication for 
Leslie H.203 Leslie had been arrested for, and had plead guilty to, 
stealing alcoholic beverages and cigars from a liquor store, as well as 
assaulting the clerk when he confronted her and her friends.204 During 
 
 196.  Id. at 1250. 
 197.  Id. at 1249. 
 198.  Courts, California Courts, http://www.courts.ca.gov/courts.htm (last visited May 13, 
2017). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  E.g., In re Israel. O., 233 Cal. App. 4th 279 (2015); see also Eddie E. v. Superior 
Court, 234 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2015).  
 202.  Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 4th 340 (2014). 
 203.  Id. at 343-44. 
 204.  Id. at 345. 
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the delinquency proceedings, Leslie moved for the court to make the 
SIJS findings on the grounds that she had been abandoned by her father 
and abused by her mother.205 The trial court expressed concern that, if 
it were to grant SIJS findings to juveniles who had been arrested and 
convicted and/or plead guilty to a crime, it would incentivize illegal 
immigrants to break the law to become dependent on a juvenile 
court.206 
The Court of Appeal looked at the plain language of the SIJS 
statute as it had been amended in 2008207 and held that, although the 
Superior Court had considered the proper criteria,208 it had declined to 
make the appropriate SIJS findings out of “misplaced policy 
considerations . . . despite ample, uncontroverted evidence supporting 
the [SIJS] findings.”209 The Court of Appeal defined the juvenile 
court’s role in the SIJS process as “not to determine worthy candidates 
for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned 
alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent 
or be safely returned in their best interests to their home country.”210 
The California appellate courts have unwaveringly stood behind this 
principle and, as such, have routinely found that the Superior courts 
should reach the merits of SIJS petitions, the overwhelming majority 
of which are granted.211 California courts  have been consistent in their 
application of SIJS requirements and procedures and, thus need not be 
discussed further. 
PART III. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
As evidenced by the cases discussed above, there is a vast array 
of policies, procedures, and proceedings state courts across the country 
 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 346. 
 207.  Leslie H., 224 Cal. App. 4th at 349-50. 
 208.  The court considered (1) whether Leslie H. was in fact dependent upon the court 
within the meaning of the SIJS statute, (2) whether returning to her parents was a viable option, 
and (3) whether repatriation was in Leslie H.’s best interest. Id. at 344. The court found that 
Leslie H.’s delinquency was controlling as to factors two and three and did not make any 
findings of fact in their regard. Id. 
 209.  Id. at 350. 
 210.  Id. at 351. 
 211.  E.g., B.F. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 4th 621 (2012) (holding that the probate 
court was authorized to make the SIJS findings); see also In re Israel O., 233 Cal. App. 4th 
279 (2015) (holding that, despite suitable parental home, a minor may establish reunification 
with other parent as not viable so as to satisfy SIJS requirements); Eddie E. v. Superior Court, 
234 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2015) (holding that the petitioner’s mother’s death did not cause 
reunification with the mother to cease being not viable due to abandonment). 
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have implemented to deal with their fact-finding duties under the SIJS 
provision. Several states have developed serious problems in their 
adjudication of SIJS petitions through erroneous interpretation of the 
proper role of the state court in the SIJS process or misinterpretation 
of the federal statute or the regulations governing its application.212 
These problems result in new hurdles that SIJS seekers are forced to 
overcome before they are able to submit their application to the 
USCIS. While it is true that this “delegation of duties” between the 
state and federal systems alleviates the burden on the federal courts 
and immigration agencies, it has resulted, and will continue to result, 
in inconsistent outcomes based on the various state approaches.  
The lack of uniformity in how the various states treat and 
adjudicate SIJS petitions is a significant problem. Currently, two 
juveniles could have the exact same set of circumstances surrounding 
their petitions, but the outcome could be different based solely on the 
state in which their petition is brought, where one juvenile’s 
application for citizenship could be denied while the other is granted. 
Uniformity across the states is important because it promotes equity, 
as well as the “best interest of the child” approach endorsed by the 
CRC.213  
The unique mixture of state and federal power in SIJS procedures 
is one of the primary problems that have caused the lack of uniformity. 
As demonstrated in Florida, some state courts have struggled with their 
perceived role in what they perceive as a decision regarding 
immigration.214 This creates a lack of uniformity when, absent the 
requisite findings of fact at the state level, a petitioner for SIJS is 
precluded from submitting the petition to INS for consideration.215 
Thus, a petitioner submitting his or her petition in Florida is less likely 
to get the requisite findings of fact, or at the very least have his or her 
petition subjected to heightened scrutiny in the name of public policy, 
than would a petitioner in Maryland submitting an identical petition.216 
 
 212.  See supra Part II.A-B. 
 213.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 208-09. 
 214.  E.g., In re F.J.G.M., 196 So.3d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); see also In re 
S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d 897, 900-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 215.  Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 214 (discussing procedure for submitting petition to INS 
once the requisite finding of facts are made). 
 216.  Compare In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that 
“although it is clear that under our federal system the policies pertaining to the entry of aliens 
and their rights to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress, we are being asked to 
provide an initial stamp of approval to a child’s request for SIJ status and permanent residency 
as if we are federal customs agents”) with Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 451 (2015) 
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What follows are proposed solutions to identified problems, and 
suggestions that could help curb the development of additional 
problems in the future. 
A. Problems 
i. Varying Requirements Under State Statutory Law 
In re Guardianship of Zealand W. had the practical effect of 
adding a procedural obstacle in the path of a juvenile seeking SIJS 
findings in Maryland that is not found in other states.217 As a result of 
the Court’s ruling in Zealand, in order for a third party to be given 
guardianship over a minor, thereby enabling the court to make the 
requisite SIJS findings, the parental rights of all surviving parents must 
have been previously severed or severed during the guardianship 
proceedings.218 This represented a shift in Maryland family law 
adjudication that could have disastrous effects on SIJS seekers. While 
this case did not deal with SIJS factors directly, it dealt with one of the 
primary methods by which SIJS seekers are able to get into juvenile or 
family courts: guardianship petitions. Under this ruling, petitioners 
seeking SIJS findings through a petition for guardianship by a relative 
or other qualified individual would be required to first seek, obtain, or 
otherwise demonstrate the termination of the petitioner’s parents’ 
parental rights.219 
This decision seemed to hinge on a technicality. There was 
substantial evidence that it was not in Zealand’s best interest to be 
placed with his mother, since custody had been awarded to his father 
during the divorce and his mother had only been allowed supervised 
visits.220 The Court failed to address the substantive issues and instead 
focused its attention on whether or not the Maryland Estates and Trusts 
Article allowed a circuit court to grant a third party guardianship of a 
minor when that minor’s parent was still alive, his or her parental rights 
 
(stating that “[t]he federal government delegated [the power to make these determinations] to 
State juvenile courts because these courts are the appropriate forum for child welfare 
determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best interests”). 
 217.  Compare In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 86 (requiring a SIJS 
seeker’s parent(s)’s rights be terminated prior to a guardianship being established under 
Maryland law) with In re F.G.J.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (deciding 
on a case where the minor’s mother petitioned the Florida court for a finding of dependency 
based on abandonment by the minor’s father). 
 218.  In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 86. 
 219.  Id.  
 220.  Id. at 71-72 (discussing the marriage between Zealand’s parents, the divorce, and the 
mother’s “history of serious alcohol abuse”). 
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had not been terminated, and no testamentary appointment had been 
made.221 Of notable concern is that the Maryland Estates and Trusts 
Article does incorporate the best interests of the child in its 
adjudication, which is inapposite to the intent behind SIJS findings 
being made by state juvenile courts.222 This put a new requirement on 
those seeking SIJS in Maryland: that the court terminate the parental 
rights of the SIJS seeker before awarding guardianship. This could 
dissuade youth from seeking SIJS, since many are fleeing poverty and 
danger-ridden homelands where their parents were unable to provide 
for them, not out of a lack of affection or devotion, but simply out of a 
lack of financial means. This would have the practical effect of 
denying SIJS to many deserving youth. 
Another source of variance amongst the states is the different 
cutoff ages for juvenile determinations. Under Florida law, a child, for 
purposes of dependency proceedings, is “any unmarried individual 
under the age of 18 years.”223 Under Maryland law, a child is “an 
unmarried individual under the age of 21 years.”224 This is one of the 
starkest differences between the states and is a clear example of why 
change is necessary. A nineteen-year-old youth in Florida would be 
precluded from even filing a request for SIJS findings since he or she 
could not be found dependent on a Florida court because of his or her 
age.225 This irreconcilable difference requires some sort of solution to 
provide consistency.  
ii. State Court Interpretation of Federal Law 
In O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families,226 Florida 
began requiring that the abuse, neglect, or abandonment not only have 
transpired,227 but that it is not “too far removed” from the petition such 
 
 221.  Id. at 85-86. 
 222.  See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-702; see also Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. 
App. 440, 451 (2015) (stating that “[t]he federal government delegated [the power to make 
these determinations] to State juvenile courts because these courts are the appropriate forum 
for child welfare determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best 
interests”). 
 223.  FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(12). 
 224.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-201(a). 
 225.  See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006) 
(requiring that the juvenile be declared dependent on a juvenile court); see also FLA. STAT. § 
39.01(12) (defining child or youth as “any unmarried individual under the age of 18 years”). 
 226.  O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 227.  The Florida courts have expressed a need for trial courts to “use the most caution to 
avoid being nothing more than a “‘rubber-stamp,’” and to carefully consider all evidence and 
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that the minor is not in continued danger of harm.228 This case was one 
of many in Florida to demonstrate the courts’ frustration with the 
frequency and quantity of dependency petitions based on a desire for 
SIJS findings.229 The Court was more interested in ferreting out the 
meritless or contrived requests for SIJS findings than determining the 
best interests of the child. The Court acted as a gatekeeper charged 
with granting or denying entry to the SIJS seeker, rather than a fact 
finder whose statutory duty was to make a specific factual finding 
regarding the history and characteristics of the SIJS seeker. The 
Florida court reached its conclusion out of misplaced policy concerns 
regarding federal immigration policy and congressional intent 
regarding the SIJS statute, as well as an admitted confusion as to the 
nature of its role in the SIJS framework.230 Florida is not the only state 
to face this dilemma, as many states, including Maryland, Minnesota, 
and New York, have grappled with the complex federalism framework 
that enshrouds the SIJS provision.231 The complexity has given several 
courts pause and has caused a reluctance to reach the merits in favor 
of extension of state law or interpretation of federal law that disposes 
of the case.232 
B. Solutions 
i. Promulgating Federal Regulations 
One solution to procedural blocks and lack of uniformity amongst 
the states is the promulgation of federal regulations detailing 
appropriate proceedings and procedures for making the SIJS findings 
consistent across jurisdictions. Detailing appropriate procedures and 
definitions would help state courts that have struggled with the 
question of their ability to reach the SIJS findings during state court 
 
not decide these dependency case “for sake of expediency or sympathy.” Id. at 1250. 
 228.  Id. at 1249. 
 229.  Id. at 1251 (Forst, J., dissenting); see also In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 538 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2016); In re S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d 897, 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 230.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 900-01. 
 231.  See Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 445-48 (2015) (discussing where the trial 
court had refused to make the SIJS findings because the petition was made during a proceeding 
for absolute divorce and custody); see also In re Welfare of A.S., 882 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2016) (holding that placement of the juvenile on probation for a traffic offense did 
not constitute “dependency” on a state court or custody of a state agency as required for SIJS); 
In re Jose H., 40 N.Y.S.3d 710, 716 (2016) (holding that the petitioner had not been declared 
dependent on a juvenile court, but rather had been committed to state prison for committing a 
crime for which he was charged as an adult). 
 232.  See supra, note 231 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings.233 Additionally, because of the SIJS’ unique joinder of 
both state and federal authority, uniformity on the state level, once 
achieved, would match uniformity on the federal level, where a single 
body, INS, is charged with rendering a decision regardless of the state 
in which the factual findings are made.234 
Federal regulations defining key statutory terms would also 
promote uniformity. For instance, defining what constitutes neglect, 
abuse, or abandonment for purposes of SIJS, instead of relying on law 
that varies by state, could help state courts reach uniform decisions 
regarding a child’s appropriate designation. This would help avoid the 
institution of obstacles such as those that arose in Florida over the 
requirement that the abuse, neglect, or abandonment not be “too far 
removed” from the petition,235 in addition to the different standards of 
neglect across the states.236 The promulgation of federal regulations 
would help ensure uniformity across the states without drastically 
changing the way SIJS petitions are brought or the manner in which 
they are adjudicated.  
ii. Creating a New SIJS Proceeding in State Courts 
Another solution is to create a stand-alone SIJS proceeding that 
would make the juvenile dependent on the state court for the findings 
of fact without requiring an underlying cause of action that would put 
SIJS seekers before a state juvenile court. In such a case, an SIJS seeker 
would file a stand-alone petition for SIJS findings of fact in an 
appropriate court. This would eliminate the issue that has arisen in 
Maryland where, in order to place a child under the guardianship of a 
third party, thereby rendering the child dependent on the court, courts 
are now mandating the termination of the surviving parent(s)’ paternal 
rights .237 This would also put the court on notice of the request for the 
 
 233.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 445-46 (discussing where the Circuit Court had refused 
to reach the merits of the SIJS petition when made during a divorce proceeding). 
 234.  Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing in Family Court: Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 201, 214 (2014). 
 235.  In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that 
abandonment of the minor by his father over 13 years prior to the petition was “too far 
removed” to permit a finding of abandonment); see also In re S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d 897, 904-
05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that mere failure to provide for the child’s needs is 
insufficient to constitute neglect). 
 236.  Compare In re S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d at 904-05 (holding that mere failure to provide 
for the child’s needs is insufficient to constitute neglect) with In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. 
707, 721 (2015) (stating that in Maryland allowing a minor to drop out of school constitutes 
negligence). 
 237.  In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. 66, 85-86 (2014). 
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SIJS findings, since it would be its own separate proceeding, thereby 
avoiding the problems posed in Simbaina v. Bunay, where the circuit 
court failed to address the SIJS request because it believed SIJS 
findings required the filing of particular pleadings.238 This would also 
make these adjudications more procedurally consistent, eliminating the 
disparity between states that do not grant dependency beyond the age 
of eighteen239 and those that allow individuals under the age of twenty-
one 240 to become dependent on the court. 
Creating a separate state level cause of action would enable courts 
in more cases to reach the truly important issue, and the reason they 
are part of the process, of the best interests of the child. By removing 
the procedural requirement of a valid underlying state law cause of 
action, otherwise meritorious petitions would cease to be dismissed or 
denied based solely on the lack of dependency on the court, and would 
be able to proceed on the merits. 
This result could also be reached by amending the SIJS statute to 
no longer require a finding of dependency. Such an amendment would 
allow SIJS seekers to request the SIJS findings as declaratory relief 
separate from any underlying state law causes of action under the state 
court’s general jurisdiction as a court of equity. This amendment 
would help reduce frequency of the unfortunate occurrence where the 
approval or denial of a petition hinges on the state of the law regarding 
custody determinations of the state in which it is brought, rather than 
on the facts or merits of the case.241 
iii. Creating a Federal Court Division to Handle SIJS Petitions 
A more drastic and unprecedented approach would be to create 
an SIJS division in the federal district courts and grant them 
jurisdiction over SIJS petitions. This would assist with creating a 
uniform procedural framework, with federal district courts applying 
federal procedural law, although it would not tackle the inconsistencies 
inherent in state law when considering whether or not a minor has been 
abused, abandoned, or neglected, since the district courts would 
 
 238.  Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 458. 
 239.  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(12) (defining a child as “any unmarried person under the age of 
18 years”). 
 240.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-201(a) (defining child as “an unmarried individual 
under the age of 21 years”). 
 241.  Compare In re Dany G., 223 Md. App. 707 (2015) with O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children 
and Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
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continue applying state substantive law. 
This solution would be most effective if coupled with the 
proposed promulgation of federal regulations defining the key 
statutory terms, such as “neglect,” “abandonment,” and “abuse.” In 
this scenario, Congress could continue to benefit from family and 
juvenile court judges’ expertise, since those who are nominated would 
ostensibly be nominated from those very courts. The judges assigned 
to this division could be required to have experience adjudicating 
juvenile matters at the state level.242 While this would initially 
constitute a tremendous shift from allowing all juvenile and family 
matters to remain at the state level, it could be done under the auspices 
of retaining all things related to immigration at the federal level. 
iv. The Best Solution: Federal Question in Federal Court 
Ultimately, the most effective solution would be the creation of a 
SIJS division in the federal district courts, as well as a statutory 
amendment creating a federal cause of action for SIJS seekers. First, it 
guarantees the uniformity of procedure, since federal courts are bound 
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regardless of the nature 
of their jurisdiction.243 Second, the amendment of the SIJS statute 
giving the power to make SIJS determinations to a federal court would 
necessarily confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal district 
courts under the doctrine of federal question jurisdiction, since any 
proceeding requesting the SIJS findings would stem from the INA. 
Since the inception of SIJS, Congress has amended its requirements 
twice, making a third amendment conceivable. Therefore, this solution 
becomes easily obtainable. 
Third, the creation of such a division could carry with it the 
requirement that judges assigned or nominated to the courts be 
approved by the state court and/or division tasked with hearing 
juvenile matters. Such a requirement would preserve the benefit of the 
expertise of the state bench dealing with juvenile concerns. Lastly, and 
potentially most importantly, this would remove the federalism issue 
 
 242.  This should be a requirement, as the primary reason for the delegation of the fact 
finding to the state courts was to benefit from the state judiciaries’ experience regarding 
juvenile determinations. See Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 451 (2015) (stating that 
“[t]he federal government delegated [the power to make these determinations] to State juvenile 
courts because these courts are the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations 
regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best interests”). 
 243.  See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern 
the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts”). 
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currently posed by SIJS and the corresponding dilemmas with which 
state courts have struggled.244 The assignment of SIJS proceedings to 
the federal courts would keep all immigration matters at the federal 
level, relieving the difficult balancing act from the state courts. The 
amendment would also solve the issue surrounding the lack of 
uniformity regarding what constitutes a declaration of the juvenile as 
dependent on a juvenile court. Such a requirement would have been 
foregone to create the stand-alone federal cause of action, as the 
petitioner would necessarily be dependent on the federal court for the 
adjudication of his or her petition. 
The financial costs involved in creating such a department would 
be minimal. The department would be part of the federal district court 
system and could be limited to one judge per state, although more 
could be nominated as needed for states or districts with heavier SIJS 
caseloads.  Additionally, for those states and/or districts with a limited 
caseload, a separate department would not be necessary. Instead, these 
new federal SIJS petitions would be added to the federal docket of the 
appropriate district court. Alternatively, those states and/or districts 
with limited caseloads could be consolidated into one SIJS division. 
This would maintain the ability of the division to select a judge with 
juvenile experience. 
Politically, this solution should be very uncontroversial, in part 
due to the noncontroversial nature of statutory amendments, a frequent 
occurrence at all levels of government. In larger part, however, such 
an amendment would remove the hazardous question of federalism 
from the state judiciaries, thereby removing the need for state judges 
to ponder their role in the immigration system. Given the dislike some 
state courts have expressed at their current role in the SIJS process, it 
is likely that many state judiciaries would greet news of such an 
amendment with relief. At the very least, such an amendment would 
be a welcome sight in the Florida courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of SIJS was a step in the right direction for the 
 
 244.  In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing at length, 
and noting its disapproval of, the complexity of the federalism dynamic posed by SIJS, and 
stating that “although it is clear that under our federal system the policies pertaining to the 
entry of aliens and their rights to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress, we are 
being asked to provide an initial stamp of approval to a child’s request for SIJ status and 
permanent residency as if we are federal customs agents”). 
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United States towards protecting an incredibly vulnerable segment of 
the population, but much work needs to be done for it to truly achieve 
such an objective. Although SIJS relief is obtainable, inconsistencies 
between states/jurisdictions and the novel and complex nature of the 
relationship between state and federal law SIJS creates have become 
obstacles to those seeking the relief to which they are entitled. This has 
resulted in the denial of petitions and requests for SIJS findings in one 
jurisdiction that would likely have been granted in another, making the 
determination of SIJS more dependent on the jurisdiction the juvenile 
lives in than on the juvenile’s past or future. Drastic measures are 
needed to give the SIJS provision of the INA the “teeth” it needs to 
accomplish its lofty and inspirational goal of assisting those in most 
need of protection, the world’s youth, regardless of which state they 
call home. 
 
